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INTRODUCTION

may be considered as a private good. For instance, in
many countries water is sold as a commodity by
individuals, and the bottled-water industry is growing.2
However, in most of the developed countries water
resources are considered as a public good and
governments reserve the right to establish institutions
for allocating all water within their boundaries 3 . From a
purely ethical standpoint, every person does have a right
to fresh water access and no consumer may be excluded
because of price. All this having been said, it appears
that the jury is still out on the definitive verdict of
whether water should be classed as a public or a private
good. In the following paragraph, we use the concept of
quality to help make the choice.

The water industry is typically a network industry.
However, this industry has special features because
water of good quality is essential for the existence of
human life. Matters of ethics and efficiency are
therefore inextricably linked together and raise a
number of fundamental, ethical, and practical questions
for society.1 In this paper, we look at how the topic of
drinking water management relates to the traditional
analysis of natural monopoly regulation and argue that
regulating natural monopolies, which involve
irreversible environmental and public health risks,
changes the usual regulating schemes in such a way that
risk coverage and insurance premiums must be
incorporated in the analysis. We emphasize the essential
nature of water and its quality because of their
implications for human health and the environment. In
this context, water and its quality engage the regulator’s
liability as well as that of the monopolist. We show that
this complicates the case of no-risk regulation, where
the objectives of regulation are limited to ensuring that
water services are offered at a proper price and that the
firms allowed to benefit from the monopoly are those
that are the most efficient in using it.

Consider the principle of equity in the right to life. This
principle and the essential nature of water rules out
discrimination, and consequently, the same quality of
water should be available to everyone in a given
geographical area. Hence, the public good
characteristics of water are mainly associated with the
necessity to keep drinking water as pure and accessible
as possible. J.S. Mill made the case for water as a public
good when he wrote:
“the case to which the water-supply of towns
bears most analogy, are such as the making of roads
and bridges, the paving, lighting, and cleansing of
streets. The nearest analogy of all is the drainage of
towns, with which the supply of water has a natural
connection. Of all these operations it may
reasonably be affirmed to be the duty of
Government, not necessarily to perform them itself,
but to ensure their being adequately performed. I do
not say that it ought not to be lawful to build a
house without proper drainage and proper watersupply; but assuredly every one who owns or builds
a house in a town should have the means of effectual
drainage and water-supply put in his power, at the
smallest practicable expense (J.S. Mill p.434).”

The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we
define the characteristics of drinking water management
and the nature of the natural monopoly, and develop the
role of the risk and uncertainty that face regulators and
managers. In Section 3, we use the French case to
illustrate the problem and present a methodology for
solving it. Section 4 concludes.
REGULATION OF THE DRINKING WATER
SECTOR
Drinking Water a Social and Specific Good: Public or
Private?
Is water a public good? From an economic point of
view, many of its characteristics would tend to put
“water” in the private commodity category. Indeed, it
can be infinitely divided, stored, privately owned, and
sold on a market, etc. Hence, because of these features it

With this in mind, water appears to be a public good
with private features in its distribution. These are the
characteristics of a natural monopoly.
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Drinking Water as a Natural Monopoly

communes. The third type is a delegation system
whereby the municipality or the “Super Régie
Municipale,” allows a private firm to manage the
allocation and the treatment of fresh water and sewage.
In France, quantitatively, the delegation system is by far
the most popular.

Our definition of a natural monopoly is closely related
to that of Baumol et al. (1977):
“By natural monopoly we mean an industry whose
cost function is such that no combination of several
firms can produce an industry output vector as
cheap as it can be provided by a single supplier.”

In a delegation contract, the municipality temporarily
cedes its management powers to a private firm. The
delegation can be total or partial, but it is always
temporary and long term for a period of up to thirty
years. Full privatization of the water supply, as in the
United Kingdom for example, is prohibited. At the
contract’s maturity, control reverts to the municipality,
which may choose to renew delegation with the existing
firm or a competitor, or to assume direct management
itself. Thus, the procedure appears competitive.
However, because of several factors linked to the
oligopolistic nature of the water management market in
general and to the French institutional framework in
particular, there is no effective competition and the
delegated firms are able to extract excessive profits at
the expense of the community of consumers.

Applied to water management, water utilities are
monopolies not only because of the economic
advantages related to scale economies but also because
of the economic advantages related to technical
considerations that prevent competition between several
providers in a given area. The management of a pipe
network, the related heavy investments, the supply and
the treatment of water, and sometimes the sewage plants
necessitate a monopoly. The monopoly is more a result
of conditions related to the management and
maintenance of a unique infrastructure of pipes and
plant than it is with economies of scale. It is difficult to
imagine competition in the management and
maintenance of this infrastructure. This leads us to
consider the irreversibility of the investments in the
field of water supply.4

When natural monopolies face environmental or health
risks, as do drinking water utilities, the risks are more
than simple uncertainty about sales levels and income
losses. They involve the liability of the regulator for
environmental and health damages and the necessity for
him to incorporate them accurately in his strategy. Thus,
it appears intuitively that these regulation rules should
be different from those of the generally accepted natural
monopoly theory where the stakes are limited to the
levels of supply and demand. Hence, the very notion of
regulation is changed, and coordination and incentives
under risk become central concepts. Boyer and Robert
(1997), for instance, estimate that the electricity
industry should be regulated as a natural monopoly
because of the important potential economies of scale
present in the network activities. Where drinking water
is concerned, the inefficiency is not related to foregone
economies of scale, but rather to the risk of irreversible
damage to both the environment and public health.

Regulating Natural Monopolies Under Risk
More than a century ago, John Stuart Mill observed that
the
“water supply of London may be provided in
three ways: by trading companies, as at
present; by a functionary or a board of
functionaries appointed by Government; or by
some local or municipal authority (J.S. Mill
(1851 p.433).”
Since these early times, the debate has changed very
little except that, nowadays, nobody would willingly
empower a board of civil servants to manage a local
public utility. Hence, the debate is not whether the water
supply should be privately or publicly managed, but
rather how to manage regulation efficiently.

Incorporating Risk in the Regulation Scheme: The
French Case

The French system of water management is a case in
point. The relevant regulatory level is essentially
municipal, and three main types of water management
are at work at the municipal level. The first type, called
the “Régie Municipale,” is a system of direct
management involving the Mayor and its Council where
the municipality is in charge of the whole management
system (plants, pipe-network, etc.). The second type, a
sort of “Super Régie Municipale,” gathers the resources
of several municipalities to form an association of

Efficient regulation means that from an economic and
institutional standpoint rules are defined so that the
outcome of the system is equivalent to the outcome of
competition. Because space is lacking, these points will
not be developed here but the important aspects of the
discussion can be found in Boyer and Robert (1997),
Waterson (1988), Laffont and Tirole (1993). Where the
role of risk is concerned, two major issues are at work.5
The first one relates to damage liability and the
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contractual relationship between principal and agent.
The second relates to the appropriate pricing rule, given
the risks associated with both income and damages.
Because French law explicitly recognizes the role of
damage liability, we use the French case to illustrate
these points.

respectively the arrival rate for losses at the low socially
mandated precautionary level (low technical and quality
standards), the arrival rate for losses at the high socially
mandated precautionary level (high technical and
quality standards), and the probability per unit of time
of passing from the low to the high level.

The Regulator and Damage Liability

The idea behind the precautionary levels is that with a
given infrastructure and technology, lower minimum
technical standards will lead to fewer accidents being
judged by the courts as caused by negligence. Thus,
λ < φ . The reason that passage from one level to
another is modeled as a random process with ρ as the
instantaneous probability of change is because there is
no national standard setting board in France.
Consequently, individual courts are free to decide for
themselves what the minimum precautionary level
(technical and quality standard) should be. As might be
expected in the land of 50 million notoriously
independent thinkers, the minimum precautionary level
can and does vary from court to court.

The role of damage liability in the French system of
water management can be summarized as follows:
According to French law, the municipalities are in
charge of water resource management, including
protection of the water supply, river management, and
pollution control. In this framework, the mayor is
personally liable for any damage due to negligence on
his part. The liability is civil, to the extent of all his
worldly belongings, as well as criminal and is
transferred to the municipality itself if damages exceed
the total value of the mayor's net worth. Mayors have
been prohibited by law from using the municipality to
insure themselves against this particular risk.
Furthermore, there is a high level of uncertainty about
how negligence will be defined by the individual courts.
All this puts the mayor in a precarious position. By
delegating authority to a private firm, the mayor can
eliminate his personal liability, which is transferred to
the delegated firm. Given the uncertainty surrounding
the traditional measure of protective cover, delegation
has consequently become popular with mayors and
municipalities as an effective instrument in eliminating
their negligence liability. Herein lies the seed of a costly
conflict of interest between the personal welfare of the
mayor and the well being of the community. It is clear
that the conflict of interest arises from the damage
liability associated with managing the water supply.

Equation (1) measures the cost of the agency conflict
between mayor and community as the value of an
insurance policy that covers all losses due to negligence
when there is a doubt about how negligence will be
defined. The uncertainty about how negligence will be
defined is embodied in the two socially mandated
precautionary levels. Thus, equation (1) says that the
value of the insurance policy covering a low risk that
might become a high risk is equal to the present value of
expected cash flows resulting from losses discounted at
the riskless rate increased by a risk premium ρ , the
probability that the change in riskiness will actually
occur. Thus, it values the personal liability of the mayor
when there is a possible change in the risk level. This is
the price (agency cost) that the Community would have
to pay to cover the mayor's risk as a means of
eliminating the agency conflict and inducing him to
make the water management choice that is in the best
interest of the Community. When formulating a pricing
policy, the regulator cannot ignore this cost.

Clark and Mondello (2000a) have shown that this
problem can be analyzed in the context of insurance
theory where the cost of the mayor’s guarantee can be
priced as the value of an insurance policy W
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The Formulation of an Optimal Pricing Policy When
Income is Stochastic

where x represents the loss level in the case of a
catastrophe due to negligence and follows geometric
Brownian motion

In the formulation of an optimal pricing policy, it is
important to know whether the contractual relationship
between the firm and the regulator is reversible. The
problem of delegation irreversibility is tied to economic
rents and is a consequence of the public authorities
negotiating disadvantage in the face of the cartelized
water management firms. It can be described as follows.
In a delegation contract, a municipality temporarily
cedes its management powers to a private firm. In

dx ( t ) = α x ( t ) dt + σ x ( t ) dz ( t )
(2)
r is the riskless rate, α is the rate of growth of the
potential loss, σ is its standard deviation, dz is a

standard Wiener process with zero mean and variance
equal to dt and λ , φ , ρ with λ < φ are intensity
parameters of Poisson processes representing
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France, the law allows partial or total delegation of
water management, but not a full privatization of the
water supply as in the United Kingdom. The contract is
long term, it is determined by an auction, and it provides
for the ongoing opportunity to renegotiate prices and
terms. At the contract's maturity, the municipality
retains control of the delegation allocation and may
choose among competitors or even revoke delegation in
favor of direct management. 6

“They are very complex in realistic cases and they
are open to manipulation, to regulatory capture and
to predatory behavior because of this complexity and
because of the fact that there is so much uncertainty
or imprecision in the estimates of the basic
parameters or basic variables you have to obtain
and know to apply them and because of the fact that
generically, the information structure on costs and
demands is incomplete.”

Changing this situation through legislation is not
feasible in the foreseeable future since it would require
a major overhaul of the French governance system with
significant effects far outside the realm of water
management.
Furthermore,
in
spite
of
the
municipalities’ inherent disadvantage, this same system
pushes them to opt increasingly for delegation. First of
all, the technology of monitoring the safety of the
existing pipe network is fully controlled by a de facto
cartel of a small number of large, specialized companies
that monopolize the market and limit the municipalities’
access.7 Secondly, the required competencies for water
management have become more and more specific
thereby making it difficult and costly for the
municipalities to find and retain qualified personnel.
Finally, and most importantly, because of a quirk in the
French administrative organization there is the above
mentioned problem of the mayor's personal liability in
the case of damage when the court judges that the harm
was caused by negligence. The result of all this is that
once a municipality has opted for delegation, the
decision is, for all practical purposes, irreversible. In the
absence of reversibility, regulation and the formulation
of an optimal pricing policy come to the fore.

Furthermore, they are not dynamic and they fail to
incorporate compensation for the uncertainty (risk)
surrounding the monopolist’s income as well as the risk
associated with damage liability, which for the French
case, is the cost of the agency conflict.
These shortcomings can be overcome with the tools of
stochastic calculus and the techniques developed in real
option theory. To make the pricing problem dynamic we
let the monopolist’s income “y” vary stochastically
through time in geometric Brownian motion

dy (t ) = α y y (t )dt + σ y y (t ) dz y ( t )
where

α y represents the expected growth rate of

income,
and

(3)

σ y is the standard deviation of the growth rate,

dz y is a standard Wiener process with zero mean

and variance equal to dt.
The regulatory problem is to determine the cap price
that includes the potential risk damages that are
captured in equation (1). Clark and Mondello
(forthcoming November 2000b) provide a solution
when the potential risk damages are treated as an annual
operating cost. To find the solution they ask the
question, “At what level of income y would it be
optimal for the municipality to revoke delegation and
manage the drinking water supply itself?” To
incorporate the potential damage liability, they let
c represent operating costs, including the insurance
premium for liability coverage. As we mentioned above,
this liability is unlimited and in the case of negligence
engages the personal responsibility for the mayormunicipality in the case of direct management and for
the firm in the case of delegation. In the absence of
market imperfections where both municipality and the
firm have equal access to technology and expertise, the
liability is the same for both. From equation (1) we
know the value of the liability is equal to W. Since the
liability is perpetual we calculate its operating cost as a

Several pricing rules may be used as regulation tools.
Among the more theoretically advanced, the most
popular are Ramsey-Boiteux and the efficient
component pricing rule (EPCR). Armstrong et al.
(1994), (1995), (1996), (1998) analyze profitmaximizing nonlinear pricing by a firm that is subject to
price cap regulation where they consider the two main
forms of regulatory constraint: (1) a cap on the firm’s
average revenue, and (2) a constraint that the firm must
continue to offer each consumer the option of buying at
the uniform price. Optimal nonlinear price schedules in
these regimes are shown to have simple
characterizations that are related to the nonlinear tariffs
that an unregulated monopolist would charge. These
authors show that of the regulatory regimes, the firm
prefers the average revenue constraint to the option
constraint
and
likes
uniform
pricing
least.
Unfortunately, these theoretical approaches suffer from
some informational difficulties summarized by Boyer
and Robert (1997 p.13):

perpetual annuity l in the formula

l = rW
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l r = W or

. Thus, the cost of the damage liability is

subsummed in the cost side of the investment's cash
flows. Finally, assume that within the output capacity
of the investment operating costs are constant.8

y∗ =

y (t ) can be
found by applying the CAPM directly to y (t ) .9 The
required rate of return will be given by

would otherwise be ( ∂y *

(4)

where r is the riskless rate of interest,

λ

ρ y, m is the correlation coefficient of the
percentage change in y (t ) with the market rate of
return and µ > α . Let µ − α = δ > 0 , which can be
price of risk,

interpreted as a dividend or convenience yield derived
from actually owning the investment.
The value of the investment project, F ( y(t )) , can then
be found by setting up a hedge portfolio with a long
position of one unit of the investment and a short
position in F ′( y(t )) units of y (t ) . Using standard
methods in stochastic calculus gives the following
differential equation:

CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have shown how the topic of drinking
water management relates to the traditional analysis of
natural monopoly regulation. We argue that from a
purely ethical standpoint, the essential nature of water
for human existence and welfare makes equal access a
right and that water is, indeed, a natural monopoly.
However, regulating natural monopolies, which involve
irreversible environmental and public health risks,
changes the usual regulating schemes in such a way that
damage liability must be included in the analysis. Using
the French case as an example because French
legislation explicitly recognizes the damage liability
associated with water management, we show that the
damage liability can be measured as the value of an
insurance policy associated with any and all losses due
to negligence on the part of the regulator or his
delegated manager. Using real options pricing
techniques, we then show how an optimal pricing policy
can be determined and how the damage liability can be
integrated into the analysis. As intuition would have it,
it turns out that the damage liability raises the cap price.

(8)

The solution to (8) is:
F = B1 y ( t ) γ1 + B2 y (t )γ 2

(9)

Using the boundary conditions in the Appendix gives:
F = B1 x ( t ) γ 1

(10)

σ2
σ2 2
) ± (r − δ −
) + 2σ 2 r
2
2
where γ 1, 2 =
are
σ2
the roots to the quadratic equation in γ ,
−( r − δ −

c
(γ 1 − 1)  + I 
 r

B1 =
γ1
(δγ 1 )
γ 1 −1

∂c > 0 ).

The foregoing solution to the regulator's problem is
intuitively appealing with practical advantages. The
intuition is that the optimal price is where the interests
of the municipality are just equal to the interests of the
monopolist and that the associated interests are
determined by objective economic considerations that
include the damage liability. The practical advantage is
that if the revocation threat is credible, the monopolist
will have an incentive to auto-regulate himself in order
to avoid losing his contract.

is the market

σ2
F ′′( y( t )) y( t ) 2 + ( r − δ ) F ′( y ( t )) y ( t ) − rF ( y( t )) = 0
2

(11)

Equation (11) gives the maximum income level or the
cap price for the monopolist. Beyond this point, it is in
the interest of the municipality to revoke delegation and
resume direct management. From (11) it is clear that
damage liability raises the minimum price above what it

The required risk adjusted rate of return on

µ = r + λσρ x ,m

γ1
c

δ  + I
γ 1 −1  r


1−γ 1

and
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APPENDIX 1
The first boundary condition is

F ( 0) = 0
which implies that B2 = 0 .

(1A)

The second boundary condition depends on income and the cost of exe rcise. There will be a value of

y (t ) , noted

y * , where it will be optimal for the commune to exercise its option. At this point it will receive the value of the
investment V less the cost I of exercising the option. This cost includes the technology costs, recruiting costs,
investment costs and indemnities that must be paid if the municipality wants to renew direct management. Thus, the
value matching
F ( y*) = V ( y*) − I

(2A)

where V is the present value of the investment's cash flows and I is the exercise price, i.e. the cost of revoking
delegation. The smooth pasting condition that makes it possible to find y * jointly with F ( y(t )) is:

F ′( y*) = V ′( y*)

(3A)

Solving (2A) and (3A) simultaneously gives the solution in the text.
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END NOTES
1

The BottledWaterWebTM Copyright 1999 Best Cellar
Communications, a division of Best Cellar LLC recalls
that “In 1993 a waterborne outbreak of Cryptosporidum
in Milwaukee caused an estimated 400,000 residents to
become ill with flu-like symptoms and a number of
deaths to those that were immune impaired. Later that
year a failure of Washington D.C.'s filtration process
caused elevated turbidity and an increase in diarrhea
illness in residents of Washington D.C. Water quality
varies from city to city, street to street, and tap to tap.
Even the water from one tap can change from day to
day depending on water treatment techniques and
blending of different sources. Other inconsistencies in
tap water come from chlorinating, which kills bacteria
in water but can produce trihalomethanes (THMs) when
it interacts with organic matter in water. THMs have
been found to be carcinogenic. From toxic dumps
leaking into the aquifers to agricultural pesticides
turning up in our faucets, our taps are under constant
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